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him is that he ran the Teamsters and was closely connected to the Mafia. He is often seen as nothing but 
a corrupt, evil, greedy sellout. The reality is a little different. In this article I discuss his record as a labor 
leader, the attacks on him by the McClellan Committee and Bobby Kennedy, and his ties to organized 
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corrective to the public's overwhelmingly negative views of him. 
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 Jimmy Hoffa used to say he’d be forgotten ten years after his death. This was an 
uncharacteristically unintelligent judgment. Forty-four years after his murder on July 30, 1975, 
Hoffa is still famous enough that one of the most celebrated movies of 2019 is about the man who 
probably killed him, Frank Sheeran. Called The Irishman, the film, directed by Martin Scorsese, 
stars Robert De Niro as Sheeran, Al Pacino as Hoffa, and Joe Pesci as Russell Bufalino, the Mob 
boss who approved the killing. For a labor leader, such a level of fame is not only extraordinary; 
it is unique.1 
 
Of course, the reasons for Hoffa’s fame are not entirely to his credit. He is seen as the 
dictatorial and corrupt union leader who was close friends with gangsters and allied his union, the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), with the Mafia. Bobby Kennedy went after him for 
years, starting with the famous McClellan Committee hearings of 1957–59 (for which Kennedy 
was the chief counsel), and finally got him convicted in 1964 on charges of jury tampering and 
fraud, for improper use of the Teamsters’ pension fund. His appeals having failed, Hoffa went to 
prison in 1967, but was released in 1971 when Richard Nixon commuted his sentence. As 
described in Charles Brandt’s bestseller I Heard You Paint Houses, on which Scorsese’s movie is 
based, Hoffa’s subsequent campaign to regain the presidency of the Teamsters was sufficiently 
threatening to the Mafia that they had him killed. 
 
The Irishman focuses on this seedier side of Hoffa’s life, thus perpetuating the image of a 
wholly amoral and self-serving criminal with which the McClellan hearings made Hoffa’s name 
synonymous. The truth, however, is more interesting than pop-cultural narratives. Jimmy Hoffa’s 
Mob connections were hardly the defining feature of his life. Rather, he deserves to be known, in 
large part, as the preternaturally effective and hard-working—20-hour days six days a week—
leader of what was then the largest union in American history, responsible for raising millions of 
truck drivers, warehousemen, laundry workers, retail clerks, and others into the middle class. 
 
With the possible exception of John L. Lewis, no twentieth-century union leader was as 
beloved by the members as Hoffa. He made it a point to be approachable and endlessly responsive: 
in speeches, for example, he regularly gave out his office phone number and insisted that members 
call him at any hour of the day or night if they had problems. The contracts he secured were 
remarkably generous—and yet, ironically, even employers profoundly admired him, considering 
him a master negotiator, a “genius,” more knowledgeable about the trucking industry than anyone, 
all in all “a great statesman” who was scrupulously honest and realistic in bargaining. 
 
 
1 This article relies primarily on the following books: Thaddeus Russell, Out of the Jungle: Jimmy Hoffa 
and the Remaking of the American Working Class (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001); Arthur A. Sloane, 
Hoffa (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991); Ralph C. James and Estelle Dinerstein James, Hoffa and the 
Teamsters: A Study of Union Power (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965); James 
R. Hoffa, The Trials of Jimmy Hoffa: An Autobiography (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1970); 
Charles Brandt, I Heard You Paint Houses: Frank “The Irishman” Sheeran and Closing the Case on Jimmy 
Hoffa (Hanover, New Hampshire: Steerforth Press, 2004); Robert F. Kennedy, The Enemy Within (New 
York: Popular Library, 1960); and Dan La Botz, “The Tumultuous Teamsters of the 1970s,” in Rebel Rank 
and File: Labor Militancy and Revolt from Below in the Long 1970s, eds. Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner, 
and Cal Winslow (New York: Verso, 2010), 199–226. 
 Indeed, the fundamental reason for the perennial fascination with Jimmy Hoffa may be not 
so much his ties to the Mafia as his sheer power and success. No other industry was more critical 
to the nation’s economy than trucking, and Hoffa did more than anyone to rationalize and stabilize 
conditions in this chaotic, competitive industry (a service for which employers were grateful). 
Bobby Kennedy may have exaggerated when he said Hoffa was the second most powerful man in 
the country, but he certainly did have a degree of power unimaginable for a union official in the 
twenty-first century. And that’s what’s so interesting about him: Hoffa symbolizes a political 
economy long gone, an era when a union leader could strike fear and loathing in the hearts of 
senators and presidents, when the old industrial working class, millions strong and capable of 
bringing the economy to its knees if it so desired, was still the foundation of the social order. 
Certain sectors of the working class were even defiantly independent of the corporate-liberal 
“consensus” of the Cold War establishment, having carved out their own self-policed political 
economy with the help of organized crime, informal deals, and a willingness to meet violence with 
violence. The Teamsters epitomized this independent working class, and Hoffa epitomized the 
Teamsters.  
 
It was the aesthetic, so to speak, of the Teamsters and their form of unionism to which 
Bobby Kennedy and other “corporate liberals” objected (together with “socially responsible” 
unionists like Walter Reuther of the United Autoworkers). As historian Thaddeus Russell argues, 
“the confrontation [between Kennedy and Hoffa] represented a cultural conflict between the rising, 
respectable professional class of the prosperous postwar years and the uncultured, unassimilated, 
and unruly industrial working class of the Depression.” To have such an untamed and independent 
social force right at the heart of society—in the age of triumphant liberalism—was an 
embarrassment.  
 
That working class is dead now. But in its heyday, it was one hell of a force to be reckoned 
with. 
 
 
The Rise of Jimmy Hoffa 
 
Years later, Hoffa formulated the moral philosophy he had imbibed from his early days in 
Indiana and Detroit: 
 
Every day of the average individual is a matter of survival. If by chance he should 
go from home to work and have an accident, lose an arm or an eye, he’s just like 
an animal wounded in the jungle. He’s out. Life isn’t easy. Life is a jungle… Ethics 
is a matter of individualism. What may be ethical to you may be unethical to 
someone else… But my ethics are very simple. Live and let live, and those who try 
to destroy you, make it your business to see that they don’t and that they have 
problems.  
 
It was in Detroit in the Depression years that Hoffa learned the law of the jungle. As a 
dockloader at Kroger’s warehouse, Hoffa led a strike against the sadistic foreman, which resulted 
in a temporary agreement with the company that improved conditions and pay. When he was fired 
a couple of years later, in 1935, for dropping a crate of vegetables on the loading dock, he was 
 immediately hired by a Teamsters official to be an organizer (or “business agent”) with Local 299. 
He was only 21, but with his boundless energy and intelligence he proved effective. 
  
Across much of the country, the IBT was beginning a sustained offensive in these years. 
In 1934 its members played a decisive role in two successful general strikes: one in San Francisco, 
where its members joined the longshoremen’s union to shut down the city, and one in Minneapolis, 
where the Trotskyists in charge of Local 574 led a strike that elicited shocking violence from the 
police and thugs hired by employers. The Teamsters’ almost total victory in this strike, leading to 
the unionization of thousands of “unskilled” workers, began its transformation from a small 
conservative craft organization to a national industrial union encompassing over two million 
members. 
  
The more politically conservative Detroit Teamsters were, in their own way, just as militant 
as the Trotskyists in Minneapolis. To organize the increasingly numerous—and abysmally paid—
intercity freight drivers, Local 299’s organizers favored a strategy much simpler than signing up 
workers and petitioning for elections that would be overseen by the newly established National 
Labor Relations Board. Instead, they approached an employer: “either enroll your workers with 
the union or we’ll bomb your trucks.” If he refused, they bombed his trucks. And sometimes his 
home. In a violent, lawless city, this strategy worked well. (They had likely learned it, in fact, from 
having their own cars bombed by “hired thugs.”) Combined with frequent strikes and strike threats, 
such intimidation resulted in an influx of new members into the local and steadily rising wages. 
  
Hoffa and his several union colleagues didn’t limit themselves to organizing drivers; 
anyone who worked on a loading platform was fair game too. “We’d go out,” Hoffa later recalled, 
“hit the docks, talk to drivers, put up picket lines, conduct strikes, hold meetings day and night, 
convince people to join the union.” It was treacherous work: “My scalp was laid open sufficiently 
wide to require stitches no less than six times during the first year I was business agent of Local 
299. I was beaten up by cops or strikebreakers at least two dozen times that year.” During one 
strike he was jailed eighteen times within a 24-hour period, since he kept returning to the picket 
line after being released. In these years he also had a list of arrests “that’s maybe as long as your 
arm” for fighting with strikebreakers, hired thugs, and members of rival unions who were trying 
to organize the same workers the Teamsters were. 
  
In 1938 two developments occurred that would later facilitate Hoffa’s centralized control 
over the entire union. First, Dave Beck, an organizer from Seattle (who went on to become 
president of the IBT in 1952), formed the Western Conference of Teamsters, an administrative 
body covering the eleven western states and British Columbia. Such a higher-level body was 
necessary for coordinating organizing and bargaining in a fragmented industry that had thousands 
of small employers and hundreds of local Teamster unions. That very year, two thousand 
employers in the eleven states signed an agreement to bring higher wages to intercity (“over-the-
road”) drivers. 
  
Around the same time, Farrell Dobbs was achieving a similar ambition in the Midwest. 
One of the Trotskyists who had led the 1934 Minneapolis strike, Dobbs realized it was inefficient 
and mutually damaging for locals to separately negotiate different wage scales for their own over-
the-road drivers. So he and his comrades, with the cooperation of the IBT leadership, created the 
 Central States Drivers Council (CSDC) to bargain for all unionized over-the-road drivers in the 
twelve Midwestern states. To force reluctant—and widely scattered—employers to come to the 
bargaining table, Dobbs gave them the kind of ultimatum that Hoffa used to great effect in later 
years: all firms with lines ending or beginning in Chicago (which meant most firms in the Midwest) 
would have to negotiate an areawide contract or face a devastating strike. They quickly complied, 
and over two weeks they and the CSDC hammered out the most ambitious and important contract 
the IBT had ever negotiated. Establishing uniform minimum wages, maximum hours, seniority 
rights, safety guarantees, a grievance committee, and a closed shop (all drivers had to belong to 
the Teamsters), the contract covered 125,000 workers at 1,700 companies. 
  
Hoffa worked with Dobbs in this historic campaign, specifically as a leader of Dobbs’ 
effort to organize those long-distance Midwestern drivers who hadn’t yet been recruited into the 
union. Whatever qualms he felt about Dobbs’ Trotskyism, Hoffa was profoundly impressed by the 
man’s strategic and organizational genius. “I was studying at the knee of a master,” he reminisced 
later.  
  
He also learned from Dobbs the usefulness of the secondary boycott. Some employers in 
Omaha and Sioux City had refused to accept the CSDC contract and locked out their unionized 
employees. Dobbs and other Teamster leaders studied the companies’ routes and decided that the 
best way to force them to capitulate was to threaten a strike against employers in Kansas City, who 
made shipments for the Omaha and Sioux City operators, unless they suspended their dealings 
with the latter. This would cut off the holdouts in Nebraska and effectively force them to sign the 
contract. The plan worked—and Hoffa was made vividly aware of the power of the secondary 
boycott, a tactic he would never be afraid to use. (After the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made such 
boycotts illegal, Hoffa found a legal loophole and defiantly continued to use them.) 
  
This tactic also inspired a broader strategy that helped the Teamsters organize industries 
contiguous to trucking, thus increasing the IBT’s membership considerably. Any company that 
depended on Teamsters for deliveries and pickups could be compelled to unionize its employees 
simply by being refused service and thereby shut down. “Warehouses, canneries, laundries, retail 
stores, bakeries, and breweries fell to this tactic,” one historian writes, “which Hoffa used to make 
the Detroit Teamsters and ultimately the entire IBT into a boundless, multi-industry union.” 
  
Hoffa’s triumphant future might have been quite different if not for a fateful decision 
Farrell Dobbs made in 1939: he resigned from the Teamsters to devote all his time to the Socialist 
Workers Party. Daniel Tobin, head of the IBT, pleaded with him to reconsider, to drop his 
Trotskyist politics and continue working with the union, even promising him the first available 
vice-presidency. Which could have been a stepping-stone to the presidency. But it was to no avail: 
Dobbs resigned his union positions, including negotiating chairman of the powerful CSDC. This 
is what made possible Hoffa’s rise to national prominence, as he wrote later in his autobiography: 
 
I was chosen to replace Dobbs as negotiating chairman. I didn’t realize, when I 
accepted the job, along with a vice-presidency [of the CSDC, not the IBT] the 
following year, that it was the post that would project me into the national limelight 
as far as the International Brotherhood was concerned, but that job really paved 
 the way to the General Presidency. As a rung in the ladder of my career, it provided 
a giant step upward. 
 
Hoffa’s star was rising on other fronts too. He had been de facto leader of Local 299 since 
1936—overseeing its financial stabilization (after near-bankruptcy) and recruitment of several 
thousand new members—and was gradually becoming de facto leader of the Joint Council of all 
Detroit locals. In 1942 he was elected to the board of directors of the Wayne County Federation 
of Labor, but more importantly, he established the Michigan Conference of Teamsters to centralize 
in his hands bargaining for all locals in the state. Weaker locals regularly negotiated subpar 
contracts for their intracity members, which exerted downward pressure on wages across the state. 
With Hoffa negotiating a uniform statewide contract, the wages of thousands of workers were 
raised, and increasingly many members became familiar with him and intensely loyal to him. 
  
But it was his achievements with the CSDC that ultimately made him wildly popular across 
the country. During World War II Hoffa’s ambitions were confined within the straitjacket imposed 
by the National War Labor Board, but starting in 1945 he was able to negotiate contracts that 
contained wage increases as high as 20 percent or even 50 percent. He brought tens of thousands 
more drivers into the Midwestern agreement and established a Central States health and welfare 
program funded entirely by employer contributions. And he did what the CIO failed to do with its 
postwar Operation Dixie: he organized the South. Using the secondary boycott, it wasn’t 
particularly challenging (at least in principle). He ordered warehousemen and dockworkers to 
boycott Southern trucking companies crossing into the Midwest unless they hired union members, 
which after a few years forced the large majority of Southern employers to sign with the union. 
And then, by the mid-1950s, he forced them to raise wages and improve working conditions to the 
level of the CSDC. 
  
At the same time, the CSDC (renamed the Central States Conference) had undertaken two 
gargantuan projects: to negotiate uniform contracts for local workers—as opposed to over-the-
road drivers—in the 22 states the Conference now covered, and to complete the unionization of all 
trucking companies in these states. By 1957, these goals were achieved. 
  
Hoffa’s meteoric rise in the IBT was cemented at the 1952 convention, when he was 
unanimously elected a vice-president of the union, the youngest ever (at 39). He quite possibly 
could have been elected president, but he preferred to engineer Dave Beck’s election in return for 
Beck’s promise not to interfere in his activities. Aside from the president, Hoffa was the most 
powerful union officer at the time, controlling the Southern and Central Conferences, and by the 
middle of Beck’s brief reign (ending in 1957) he was certainly the dominant force in the entire 
IBT.  
  
How did Hoffa rise so high so fast? Part of the answer, which will be explored below, is 
that he allied himself with a lot of useful people. But much of his success was due simply to his 
personality and intelligence. According to people who knew him, he had an “almost hypnotic” 
charisma, was a “master psychologist,” “the smartest guy I know,” “like an elephant with his 
memory—it’s beyond belief,” and expert in the minutiae of labor law. In the 1960s he would often 
give talks at universities or business executive lunches, discoursing perceptively on the history of 
labor legislation or jousting with economists and lawyers, leaving initially hostile audiences so 
 impressed they would give him a standing ovation (as on one occasion at the Harvard Law School 
Forum). He was supremely confident and supremely competent. 
 
In addition to all this, of course, he was infinitely ambitious. 
  
He wanted the union to be millions strong. It’s almost as if he shared the old IWW dream 
of One Big Union for the entire working class—even as he rejected the concept of social-
movement unionism associated with both the political left and, in a diluted way, liberals like 
Walter Reuther. Just before Hoffa was elected president in 1957, he wrote a “policy statement” 
that included earmarking at least 25 percent of the IBT’s income to organizing. This was at a time 
when the AFL-CIO, to which the Teamsters belonged, was (myopically) devoting about 5 percent 
of its revenue to organizing. A year later, even as the McClellan hearings—broadcast on 
televisions around the country—were making his name synonymous with corruption and 
criminality, Hoffa announced a plan to bring every policeman in the U.S. into the IBT. “It is a 
piece of unmitigated gall,” one political official responded, speaking for multitudes. Hoffa also 
planned to establish a “Conference on Transportation Unity,” under his leadership, that would 
bring together the IBT, the International Longshoremen’s Association, the National Maritime 
Union, railroad brotherhoods, airline unions, in total more than fifty organizations in the 
transportation sector. Both of these projects had to be scuttled because of public opposition. But 
they indicate the scope of Hoffa’s dreams, which the union continued to pursue by organizing 
everyone from egg farmers to airline flight attendants. 
  
The other ingredient of Hoffa’s personality that was crucial to his success was the one that 
also led to his downfall: his contempt for bourgeois respectability, bourgeois hypocrisy, and liberal 
pieties. 
 
 
Hoffa vs. Kennedy 
 
Jimmy Hoffa was a contradictory man, but one quality, at least, was foundational to his 
character: brutal realism. He saw the world in terms of power relations; he rejected all ideological 
illusions and mystifications (as he saw them), from communism to liberalism to his wife 
Josephine’s Christianity. This is how he could both support Republican politicians and frequently 
sound like a Marxist. It was all in the name of realism, whatever was necessary to get ahead and 
help certain others get ahead. 
  
His attitude towards the legal system was characteristic. As a couple of academic observers 
who knew him well wrote, “To Hoffa law is not something to respect, but rather a set of principles 
designed to perpetuate those already in power, and something for others to ‘get around.’ Thus, 
Hoffa feels clear of conscience about his expertise in devising legal loopholes and practicing legal 
brinksmanship.” In effect, he thought the state was a capitalist state; therefore, he had little respect 
for the idealistic liberal corporatism of a Reuther or the Kennedy brothers. While he recognized 
the value and necessity of having a welfare state, at bottom he thought the working class had to 
take care of itself, do whatever was necessary to survive, and constantly fight against a hostile 
world. 
  
 His public statements at the time of the McClellan Committee reflected this perspective. 
“The working man is being shortchanged every day in America.” “Twenty years ago [i.e., in 1939] 
the employers had all the hoodlums working for them as strikebreakers. Now we’ve got a few, and 
everybody’s screaming.” Speaking to a television audience: 
 
Now, when you talk about the question of hoodlums and gangsters, the first people 
that hire hoodlums and gangsters are employers. If there are any illegal forces in 
the community, he’ll use them, strong-arm and otherwise. And so if you’re going to 
stay in the business of organizing the unorganized, maintaining the union you have, 
then you better have a resistance. 
 
In short, Hoffa was working-class through-and-through, the very symbol (at least to the 
public) of anti-establishmentarian defiance in a relatively conformist age, closer to the rank and 
file than probably any other major labor leader. “As he walks down the street,” one observer wrote 
in 1964, “he often halts passing trucks for a moment’s discussion with a couple of members. When 
away from Washington, D.C., he takes time out to tour the local trucking terminals, where he 
jokes, wrestles, and swears with the workers.” Nothing was more apt to provoke his legendary 
temper than an aspersion cast on the dignity of the truck driver’s occupation. 
  
Hoffa’s connections to the criminal world dated back to the 1930s and were a natural 
product of operating in a violent, cutthroat environment. If Local 299 and others hadn’t made 
alliances with unsavory people, they likely would have been gobbled up by employers and/or rival 
unions. In the late 1930s, for instance, a jurisdictional war erupted between the Detroit Teamsters 
and the United Brewery Workers, both of which unions claimed the right to represent the city’s 
beer drivers. Vicious street battles broke out while higher-level administrative bodies and even 
federal courts tried to mediate the dispute. The Teamsters developed a network of allies from local 
saloons to the Michigan statehouse, including members of the East Side Sicilian Mob and other 
criminals. With their help, and by bribing or intimidating some bar owners into only accepting 
beer delivered by Teamsters, the latter managed to keep their foot in the brewery industry. 
  
More broadly, David Witwer points out in Corruption and Reform in the Teamsters Union 
that the IBT had both been victimized by and benefited from criminal associations for decades, 
but especially starting in the 1930s. Chicago and New York were the great hubs of extra-legal 
activity. The sociologist Daniel Bell explained long ago why trucking was particularly susceptible 
to crime: “racketeers were able to enter only into small, unit-sized industries where chaotic 
competition prevailed,” meaning that “the greatest potential for racketeering is in the Teamsters 
union.”  
  
It isn’t known for sure when the Detroit Teamsters first made really durable and extensive 
connections with organized crime. Some writers, such as Dan Moldea, argue it was in the early 
1940s, when Hoffa’s union was facing an existential threat from well-funded CIO unions that were 
raiding the (AFL-affiliated) IBT’s turf to steal its members. Supposedly Hoffa was compelled to 
turn to the Mob for manpower and political influence in his many battles against the CIO.  
 
Thaddeus Russell, on the other hand, argues the decisive events weren’t until later in that 
decade, in connection with Hoffa’s attempts to control the local liquor industry (made up of 
 breweries, bars, groceries, liquor stores, and the state Liquor Control Commission) and to defend 
it from CIO incursions. By 1946 the Teamsters had organized nearly all of the industry’s workers, 
except for those in a group of businesses owned by the Mafia. The president of the largest Mob-
owned company, Bilvin Distributing Company, was William Bufalino, who was a close associate 
of (among others) Russell Bufalino, underboss of one of the most powerful crime families in the 
northeast. To break the resistance of the Detroit Mob to unionization, Hoffa hired William as 
president of Local 985, which covered jukebox workers. This created the first institutional alliance 
between the Detroit Teamsters and the Mafia, who now accepted unionization and in fact engaged 
in a violent campaign against scores of bar owners who didn’t sign with the gangster-owned, 
Teamster-organized firms.  
  
William Bufalino went on to become one of Hoffa’s most important attorneys in his later 
legal battles. And these new (or not-so-new) connections to organized crime in Detroit facilitated 
IBT connections to Mob figures all over the country. In 1951, for example, Hoffa placed the 
Central States health and welfare fund with the Union Casualty Life Insurance Agency of Chicago, 
which was owned by Allen Dorfman. Allen was the son of Paul Dorfman, who was a useful ally 
to have in Chicago: he was friends with the city’s political bosses, President Truman, leaders of 
the Chicago Federation of Labor, and AFL president George Meany. He was also connected to 
organized crime in both New York and Chicago. 
  
In general, one of the key reasons for Hoffa’s alliances with gangsters is one of the reasons 
politicians’ later attacks on him tended to be hypocritical: the Mafia was politically influential (in 
addition to being inextricably intertwined with the “legitimate” business community). “The 
mobsters have always been wedded to the political system,” one criminologist observed decades 
ago. “That’s how they survive. Without that wedding, they’d be terrorists—and we’d get rid of 
them.”2 As Thomas Reppetto has written, “in both politics and business [the Mafia] managed to 
link the underworld to the upper world,” becoming immensely powerful in the process. In the 
1940s and ’50s, if businessmen, politicians, and corrupt law enforcement were all linked to 
organized crime, it would have been odd for an ambitious union leader operating in a viciously 
competitive environment not to reach out for protection and advantage to those same powerful 
“underworld” figures. 
  
In an ABC News interview in the early 1970s Hoffa justified his relationships with alleged 
criminals and ex-convicts in terms that were, while self-serving, not wholly implausible: “these 
[organized crime figures] are the people you should know if you’re going to avoid having anyone 
interfere with your strike. And that’s what we know them for… Know who your potential enemies 
are and neutralize ’em.” To another reporter he insisted, “I’m no different than the banks, no 
different than insurance companies, no different than the politicians. You’re a damned fool not to 
be informed what makes a city run when you’re tryin’ to do business in the city.” On the other 
hand, a majority of politicians could have justly pointed out they had no ties to the Mafia. Whether 
they had no ties to any corrupt individuals or businesses, or even themselves weren’t morally and 
legally compromised in numerous ways, is another question entirely. 
  
 
2 Arthur Sloane uses this quotation in Hoffa, but he doesn’t cite the source and I haven’t been able to locate 
it. 
 Hoffa was certainly unusual, though, in his willingness to thumb his nose at propriety. 
Being convinced of the moral turpitude of the entire political-economic system, he saw no reason 
to take seriously the self-serving outrage—directed at unions (not corporations or politicians)—of 
its guardians. So he dug himself deeper, so to speak, even flaunting his relationships with notorious 
people. The Central and Southern States Pension Fund (CSPF), for example, which he browbeat 
employers into creating and funding in 1955, got him into trouble some years later. With millions 
of dollars flowing into it every month, retired union members received some of the most generous 
pensions in the country. (Teamsters were also, by now, receiving some of the most generous 
wages: there were stories of professors at elite universities quitting their jobs to become long-
distance truck drivers because they could double their pay.) But all this money, hundreds of 
millions of dollars, had to be invested, and Hoffa was in charge of the investment decisions, as he 
was in charge of almost everything. The Fund gave out countless loans to a bewildering variety of 
people and institutions, but some were given to mobsters such as Russell Bufalino, Carlos 
Marcello, Santo Trafficante, Johnny Dioguardi, and Morris Dalitz, one of the Mafia figures who 
used CSPF money to build Las Vegas casinos. While these loans may have been legal, in the 
context of the McClellan hearings they were provocative. 
  
Meanwhile, since at least the 1940s Hoffa had found it expedient to bribe public officials, 
including in law-enforcement and regulatory agencies, prosecutors’ offices, and state legislatures. 
“Every man has his price,” he was wont to say. No doubt he thought bribery, a well-established 
practice among businesses and (less so) unions through the entire industrial age (up to at least the 
1960s), was necessary to secure the cooperation of typically anti-labor governments. But its 
widespread practice by unions contributed to the stench of corruption that had, in the public mind, 
settled on organized labor by the early 1950s. 
  
The history of the public revulsion against ostensibly corrupt “Big Labor,” crystallized in 
the award-winning 1954 film On the Waterfront, is too well known to need retelling here. Grand 
jury investigations, congressional hearings as early as Senator Estes Kefauver’s Special 
Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce in 1950–51, and negative 
media coverage hounded some of the nation’s largest unions for years. This was the era, after all, 
when big business was conducting a colossal political, legal, and public-relations campaign to beat 
back the left-liberalism spawned by the popular movements of the 1930s. As Elizabeth Fones-
Wolf argues in Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945–60, 
there was a “unity of purpose within much of the business community on…the necessity of halting 
the advance of the welfare state and of undermining the legitimacy and power of organized labor.” 
The more that unions could be tarred and feathered for connections to organized crime (as if 
business itself lacked such connections, or were selflessly devoted to the common weal and knew 
nothing of legal infractions!), the better it would be for the corporate offensive against labor. 
  
Needless to say, the personal motive of self-designated crusaders against organized crime 
and union corruption was not necessarily to do the bidding of big business. Bobby Kennedy, for 
instance, who emerged as the most ferocious enemy of both the Mafia and Jimmy Hoffa, was a 
highly religious man who seems to have considered it his Catholic duty to cleanse organized labor 
of racketeers. Unions, he thought, should be sacred institutions, a movement of the oppressed—
hence his embrace of Cesar Chavez in the 1960s. According to Arthur Schlesinger, this millionaire 
son of a successful businessman, brother of a senator and president, “came to identify himself with 
 workers who were expelled, beaten, murdered.” The point, however, is that whatever Bobby’s 
motives were, his long obsession with crushing Hoffa and other despised union officials fit neatly 
into the political agenda that had been set by business. This fact, doubtless, is why he was given 
all the resources he needed to pursue his obsession. 
  
In retrospect, the Kennedy–Hoffa war from 1957 to 1964 has symbolic, sociological 
significance. It was a clash of two opposite types, two personifications of diametrically opposed 
philosophies and social strata. On one side was the liberal “do-gooder,” the idealist, the educated, 
elite professional who thinks society should be run by idealistic educated professionals who are 
noble and objective enough to have the public interest at heart. He may be inclined to think in 
terms of moral absolutes—“as Mr. Hoffa operates it,” Bobby wrote, “[the Teamsters union] is a 
conspiracy of evil”—and is certain he is on the side of Good. This idealist is motivated by whatever 
lofty ideas he chooses, but his actual role in the political economy is typically to be a smooth-
talking technocrat who enforces the rule of the capitalist class. Objectively, so to speak, he is on 
the side of business. 
  
On the other side is the working-class materialist, the realist, the person whose training in 
the art of survival has taught him that what matters above all is the struggle for resources. He may 
share Hoffa’s lack of interest in broad social reform, as well as his belief that a union is in essence 
just a business to sell its members’ labor at the highest price. He may, therefore, somewhat 
accommodate himself to society as it is. But the reality of this person’s existence is a kind of class 
struggle, a struggle to wrest what he can however he can. Doubtless the liberal professional finds 
him—and his class—vulgar, uneducated, crassly materialistic, and potentially threatening. As 
Kennedy found Hoffa. But the working-class realist doesn’t have the luxury (nor the liberal 
hypocrisy) to sneer at “materialism.” 
  
These two types tend to loathe each other. 
  
Incidentally, there is an irony here: in some respects, Hoffa had a “purer” character than 
Kennedy. He never drank or smoked—didn’t even want people to drink in his presence—and 
would never have dreamed of cheating on his beloved wife, contrary to the perennially 
philandering Kennedy brothers (whose sexual addictions, including White House orgies, revolted 
him). At a San Francisco nightclub once, he was so embarrassed by a stripper’s performance he 
turned his chair away so as not to see her. While he cursed incessantly—except around his family, 
where he was the paragon of a doting, gentle father and husband—he hated off-color jokes. Far 
from using the union as a means to enrich himself, Hoffa lived modestly, rarely even upgrading 
his (somewhat shabby) wardrobe, and constantly gave away large sums of money to anyone who 
asked for it. “He was probably the most generous, open-handed guy I’ve ever met,” an associate 
recalled, being a “sucker for any sad song or hard-luck guy.”  
  
As for the Kennedys, their aversion to the Mafia didn’t prevent them from hiring its 
members to kill Fidel Castro, as part of the secret terrorist program called Operation Mongoose. 
Seymour Hersh even reports in The Dark Side of Camelot that the Mafia, rather stupidly, got John 
F. Kennedy elected president by manipulating the vote in Illinois. Their reward was that Attorney 
General Bobby Kennedy devoted unprecedented resources to destroying them.  
 
 In effect, what Kennedy and his fellow liberals who administered the Cold War corporatist 
state wanted was a fully assimilated, “civilized,” obedient population that wouldn’t have any 
shadowy groups opaque to the state. Communists were illegitimate and had to be persecuted, as 
they were from the late 1940s on; unions that forged their own way, not consenting to political 
assimilation, were also illegitimate. Hoffa’s Teamsters, the most powerful union of all and the 
most “independent”—it even supported Republicans!—was first on the list of offenders. 
  
Dave Beck, sybarite extraordinaire, was the first big fish to be caught in the net cast by 
Senator McClellan’s Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management 
Field. But right around the same time he was exposed as corrupt, in early 1957, Hoffa was caught 
allegedly bribing a lawyer involved with Bobby Kennedy’s investigation. And then began Hoffa’s 
streak of good luck: to Kennedy’s shock, a jury found him not guilty. So later that year he went on 
to be overwhelmingly elected General President of the IBT. Kennedy was certain the election had 
been rigged, and publicly said so; it turned out he was wrong. Hoffa was incredibly popular with 
the members, and grew more so the more he was vilified in the press. “When the government came 
after him,” a union member said years later, “a lot of us wanted to take our trucks and run ’em 
over certain people… Everyone I knew thought Hoffa was a great man.” 
  
His election did result in the Teamsters being expelled from the AFL-CIO. But legally his 
troubles were overcome one after the other, infuriating Bobby, “the only member of our family 
who doesn’t forgive,” his father said. A trial on Hoffa’s alleged wiretapping of union offices ended 
in acquittal. An indictment for perjury before the McClellan Committee had to be dropped when 
the Supreme Court ruled that wiretap evidence obtained by state officials couldn’t be used in 
federal court. Over three years, the committee subpoenaed hundreds of Teamster officials and 
mobsters, filled fifty-odd volumes with witness testimony, interrogated Hoffa many times, charged 
him with more than eighty improper activities, but in the end, remarkably, proved nothing (as 
regards Hoffa, that is—other targets weren’t so lucky). Organized labor’s national reputation had 
been damaged, but legally, Hoffa had weathered the greatest congressional onslaught against a 
single individual in history. 
  
The committee’s activities did stimulate the passage, in 1959, of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 
officially known as the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Consistent with the 
committee’s almost exclusive focus on union corruption and blithe disregard of management 
corruption, this act largely ignored management and instead regulated the internal affairs of unions. 
For instance, people convicted of robbery, bribery, extortion, aggravated assault, or embezzlement 
were barred from holding a union office for five years after conviction. The act also outlawed the 
principal means by which Hoffa had built the Teamsters since the 1930s: picketing to force 
employers to recognize a union; certain forms of secondary boycotting that the Taft-Hartley Act 
had left legal; and “hot cargo” arrangements whereby employers would agree not to deal with 
another employer involved in a labor dispute. This law thus revealed what, on the broadest scale, 
was really at stake in the McClellan hearings, namely the business class’s desire to control, hobble, 
and discredit unions.3 
 
3 During the hearings, for example, the National Association of Manufacturers and the United States 
Chamber of Commerce “initiated a ferocious anti-union drive,” Thaddeus Russell writes, “and used as one 
of its selling points the issue of union corruption.” See David Witwer, Corruption and Reform in the 
Teamsters Union (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), chapter nine. 
   
The Teamsters membership seemed to understand this fact, judging by delegates’ behavior 
at the IBT convention in 1961. Russell describes Hoffa’s reception: 
 
On the day the convention opened, an airplane trailing a banner with the message 
“Re-Elect Hoffa” circled overhead as more than 2,000 delegates, nearly all 
wearing Hoffa hats and saucer-sized buttons, flooded into the Deauville Hotel in 
Miami Beach. After Hoffa was nominated by John English, who called the 
incumbent “the man with the most guts in America,” the delegates responded with 
a fifteen-minute ovation and a continuous chant of “Hoffa, Hoffa, Hoffa.”… The 
delegates then mocked the government’s attempts to impose Spartan living on their 
leaders by passing with roaring unanimity a resolution raising Hoffa’s salary to 
$75,000—the highest of any American union official at the time… 
 
As for Bobby Kennedy, he “had long been the target of the members’ insults as a 
‘pantywaist’ and ‘hatchet man’ bent on taking away the comforts they had gained from the union.” 
Except for some dissidents scattered around the country, Hoffa acquired nearly mythic status 
among members as he continued to grow the union and systematically raise wages in the 1960s, 
even as he was facing his greatest legal threats yet. 
  
Bobby hadn’t forgiven him for escaping his clutches earlier, so as soon as he became 
Attorney General in 1961 he formed the Get Hoffa Squad (as it was known), consisting of sixteen 
attorneys and thirty FBI agents. By any means necessary, including methods of questionable 
legality (such as wiretapping, bugging, and planting spies), they were going to destroy their target. 
They empaneled fifteen grand juries to investigate Hoffa. In 1962 he went on trial in Nashville, 
Tennessee for accepting payments from an employer in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. The 
government meticulously prepared its case, and yet, once again, Hoffa bested Kennedy: the trial 
resulted in a hung jury.  
  
Six months later, however, he was indicted yet again, this time for jury-tampering in the 
Nashville case. The Justice Department had uncovered evidence that he had attempted to buy some 
of the jurors’ votes. The trial took place in early 1964, and this time, at last, Bobby got his revenge: 
Hoffa was found guilty and sentenced to eight years in prison. But just a few weeks later he went 
to trial once more, on charges of defrauding the CSPF in an alleged scheme that was so complex 
and technical it took him some time even to understand what he was being charged with. In this 
case, too, he was convicted, on one count of conspiracy and three counts of mail and wire fraud. 
His sentence was five years in prison, to run consecutively after the other eight years. Five days 
after the verdict, his great obsession finally consummated, Kennedy resigned as Attorney General 
to run for the Senate. 
  
Thus, the Cold War state had won a major battle against a union that had stepped out of 
line and gotten too powerful for its own good. “The International Brotherhood of Teamsters,” 
Senator McClellan had written in 1962 for the Reader’s Digest, “is now powerful enough by itself 
to put a stranglehold on our nation’s economy… If they called a nationwide strike, you could not 
get ambulances to take sick people to the hospital, nor hearses to carry the dead. Farmers could 
not get produce to urban areas; food manufacturers could not send in canned goods…” McClellan 
 exaggerated Hoffa’s power, but his fear was shared by many people and did reflect, however 
hyperbolically, the very real power of the IBT. Corruption and outright lawlessness existed all 
over society, not least within the federal government itself.4 It is hardly a coincidence that officials 
empowered to hunt down corruption attacked, first and foremost, the largest union in the country. 
  
Indeed, in the very year that Hoffa was convicted, the IBT was attaining new heights of 
power. In January of 1964, Hoffa achieved the dream both he and his mentor Farrell Dobbs had 
cherished since the 1930s: a National Master Freight Agreement that covered hundreds of 
thousands of intercity and local truck drivers. It wasn’t entirely complete, not being wholly 
uniform and not covering all the trucking-relevant occupations of the IBT membership. But it was 
a magnificent achievement nonetheless, 25 years in the making. 
  
In the years when Bobby Kennedy and his colleagues were almost single-mindedly focused 
on, in effect, disciplining and defaming organized labor (however they personally interpreted their 
actions), Hoffa was patiently laying the foundations for realizing his dream. Year by year he was 
consolidating his power over the two regions he didn’t yet control, the East and West. Bargaining 
was highly fragmented in the East, wage diversity prevailing everywhere. Both employers and 
local union leaders, fearful, as Hoffa said, that “they would no longer be kings of their individual 
little isolated area,” resisted standardization. But through threats and cajolery, strikes and other 
kinds of leverage, Hoffa gradually imposed uniformity on West Virginia and Pittsburgh, upper 
New York state and New England, then Philadelphia, Delaware, and southern New Jersey, finally 
the troublesome New York–New Jersey metropolitan area. All these places saw conditions begin 
to approximate the privileged Central States area for which Hoffa had long been bargaining. 
  
It was a similar story in the West, although in a sense his task was easier there because 
bargaining was less fragmented. By 1961 he had achieved near-uniformity, in the process greatly 
raising wages in some areas, including Los Angeles. 
  
Having engineered a common expiration for contracts from coast to coast in 1964, Hoffa 
was able to bargain with employers across the country at the same time. The 47-page contract, “the 
most complicated one ever worked out between a union and employers” (in Hoffa’s opinion), 
covered 450,000 drivers. For most, the generous fringe benefits and across-the-board increases of 
28 cents per hour over three years and three-quarters of a cent per mile were a significant 
improvement over their previous contracts. In just a few decades, then, the trucking industry had 
gone from being completely decentralized, low-paying, and characterized by utterly inhumane 
working conditions to being highly centralized, high-paying, and relatively humane. 
  
For the next couple of years Hoffa worked towards achieving the same goal of relative 
uniformity for other occupations in his union, such as warehousemen. But by early 1967 his 
appeals of his convictions had run out, and it was time for him to report to federal prison in 
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. “The last couple of weeks before he went to jail were hellish,” said a 
staffer who was with him during this time. “He was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. He 
would lie on the floor and yell, ‘I’m not gonna go!’” But in early March, he went. 
 
 
4 For examples, see William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II 
(Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004). 
  
 
The End 
 
It’s easy to imagine that for a man with the energy of Jimmy Hoffa, prison would not be 
easy. In fact, one of his favorite expressions became “Prison is hell on earth, only hell couldn’t be 
this bad.” When he was released, after 58 months in an overcrowded, rape-plagued, drug-infested, 
violent penitentiary, his description of the experience didn’t mince words: “I can tell you this on a 
stack of Bibles: prisons are archaic, brutal, unregenerative, overcrowded hell holes where the 
inmates are treated like animals with absolutely not one humane thought given to what they are 
going to do once they are released. You’re an animal in a cage and you’re treated like one.” 
  
During his confinement he constantly suffered little indignities, such as having his anus 
inspected for drugs after returning from the visiting room, having to wear shoes and pants that 
didn’t fit, and getting nosebleeds from his job assignment of unstuffing and restuffing old 
mattresses forty hours a week.  
  
But even in prison, the labor leader found opportunities to organize. He became quite 
popular with the prisoners, for whom he formed and headed a committee that brought grievances 
to the attention of the warden. Since officially he remained president of the IBT until just before 
he was released, he was able to find jobs for many parolees, as well as sending money every year 
to his former Teamster assistants so they could buy Christmas cards for the families of his fellow 
prisoners. Guards and prisoners of all racial, religious, and educational backgrounds were, by all 
accounts, very fond of him. 
  
Meanwhile, his power in the IBT was waning. He had appointed the rather dull but loyal 
Frank Fitzsimmons as acting president in the belief that he would willingly step aside when Hoffa 
was released (hopefully early, on parole). But Fitzsimmons gradually began to show signs of 
developing an independent identity and wanting to remain in power. Not that his leadership was 
beneficial for the union. He was too weak to impose his will on the vast bureaucracy, so he restored 
decentralization to local and regional officials. Since this allowed them to build their own 
structures of power—not always to the benefit of the rank and file—they found Fitzsimmons’ 
presidency quite congenial to their taste. They also began to increase their involvement with the 
Mafia, which, in addition, was finding it easier to get loans from the pension fund than under 
Hoffa. 
  
In contract negotiations Fitzsimmons had skills, but they weren’t on the level of Hoffa’s. 
The renewals of the National Master Freight Agreement (NMFA) in 1967 and 1970 disappointed 
thousands of workers, who went on strike in cities across the country. Considerable violence broke 
out as governors mobilized the National Guard, employers sent hired goons to attack pickets, and 
the union sent its own officials for the same purpose. Employers were finding it easier to coordinate 
resistance to employee demands, in part because the NMFA had, ironically, forced unity on them, 
but also because the IBT’s leadership was increasingly ineffectual and corrupt. Wage growth 
slowed at the very moment when inflation was rising (as it continued to do through the 1970s). By 
the early ’70s, rebel rank-and-file groups were springing up in almost every major city.  
  
 In fairness to the Fitzsimmons regime, in the long run even Hoffa could hardly have been 
up to the challenges. The political economy that had allowed a Hoffa to seize the reins and 
dominate an entire industry was already coming to an end. Facilitated by technological change, 
employers were embarking on a productivity push that threatened Teamsters’ traditions of 
workplace control, as Dan La Botz argues. More companies were using pallets and forklifts; truck 
trailer lengths were growing longer; radio dispatch increasingly directed drivers; mechanized 
systems of conveyor belts distributed packages. The organization of work was changing. 
Teamsters “worked harder and under worse conditions as new equipment and new management 
techniques eliminated jobs while forcing those still employed to pick up the slack.” 
  
Hoffa had foreseen the inevitability of technological change and done what he could to 
ease the transition for suffering workers, forcing employers, e.g., to pay for new job training and 
the costs of workers’ relocation. But just as he left the picture, change was accelerating. His 
departure from the scene, however adventitious, was symbolic. 
  
As economic and political crisis gripped the country in the 1970s, the transition to a 
neoliberal economy began. Neither strike waves in industry after industry nor the formation of 
union reform movements such as the important Teamsters for a Democratic Union (founded in 
1976) could prevent the economic transition, though they could, at least, discipline and even 
eliminate corrupt leadership that was often in league with employers. With profit-rates under attack 
from heightened international competition, the overriding business agenda to cut costs, no matter 
the consequences for workers and communities, soon became the national political agenda. 
Industries began to be deregulated, a trend that has continued, with interruptions, up to the present. 
Trucking was deregulated when Jimmy Carter signed the Motor Carrier Act in 1980. Dan La Botz 
summarizes the consequences: 
 
As intended, new non-union trucking firms swarmed into the industry, union firms 
went bankrupt en masse, and a series of buyouts and mergers pushed the industry 
toward oligopoly. Part and parcel of the same processes, the IBT lost tens and 
eventually hundreds of thousands of unionized truck drivers and dockworkers, and 
within a decade the Teamsters Union had been obliged to cede its long-standing 
position as the dominant force in American over-the-road truck operations. Since 
the freight industry had been the heart of the union and freight workers the most 
political and active union members, the cost to the union as a fighting organization 
went far beyond mere numbers… 
 
The stage was set for the Reagan years, so disastrous to the labor movement. 
  
Hoffa was released from prison late in 1971, but Nixon had imposed a restriction on his 
parole, probably at the request of Fitzsimmons: he couldn’t engage in union activity until 1980. 
He hadn’t known about the restriction when agreeing to be released, and was quite bitter when a 
reporter told him of it. “Jimmy, do you want to be president of the Teamsters again?” he was asked. 
“Jack, do you like to breathe?” Hoffa replied. But, not wanting to violate the terms of his parole, 
for a couple of years he laid low and gave the impression of accepting the terms of his freedom. 
  
 Instead, he pursued a new passion: prison reform. He went on television shows, talked to 
journalists, testified before Congress, gave speeches, and did whatever he could on behalf of a new 
organization called the National Association for Justice, dedicated to reforming prisons. Using his 
negotiating skills, he was instrumental in averting several prison riots and improving conditions in 
an Ohio penitentiary. Meanwhile, he was deluged with letters and physical greetings from well-
wishers, thousands of drivers who treated him “like the Messiah,” according to one observer. All 
this can only have whetted his appetite to return to power. 
  
Which opens the curtain on the final act of his life: his legal battle to get Nixon’s parole 
restriction overturned, together with his public campaign to take back the presidency into which 
Fitzsimmons had been elected at the 1971 IBT convention (while Hoffa was still in prison). Ever 
the fighter, reckless to a fault, in 1974 Hoffa began publicly attacking both Fitzsimmons and the 
Mafia. The terms in which he did so certainly opened him to the charge of hypocrisy: he accused 
Fitzsimmons of “selling out to mobsters and letting known racketeers into the Teamsters.” “I 
charge him with permitting underworld establishment of a union insurance scheme,” he declared. 
“There will be more and more developments as time goes on and I get my hands on additional 
information.” Such statements could hardly have pleased his Mob associates. 
  
Nor did these associates want a change of administration in any case. The union was more 
corrupt than ever, and they were perfectly fine with that. It was starting to look like Hoffa intended 
to kick them out of the union’s affairs, to clean things up and get revenge on everyone he thought 
had betrayed him. “I’m going to take care of the people who’ve been fucking me,” he told Russell 
Bufalino, according to Frank Sheeran. “Everybody wants Hoffa to back down. They’re all afraid 
of what I know.” 
  
And so, in the end, Hoffa was done in by one of the deepest traits of his character: reckless 
defiance. His union career had ended because of his defiance of the law—the law of a government 
he didn’t respect—and now his life ended because of his defiance of the Mafia. On July 30, 1975 
he stood waiting in a restaurant parking lot just outside Detroit. A car pulled up; inside were his 
foster son Charles O’Brien, his hitman friend Frank Sheeran, and Salvatore Briguglio, an associate 
of the vicious mobster Anthony Provenzano. The friendly faces of O’Brien and Sheeran reassured 
him, so he got into the car, which O’Brien—not knowing what was in store—drove to a small 
suburban house nearby. The meeting to “make peace” was, as far as Hoffa knew, to take place in 
this house. Hoffa and Sheeran got out and walked up to it as the car drove away. Once inside, 
Sheeran put two bullets in the back of Hoffa’s head, after which two men waiting in the house 
brought the body to a local Mob-connected funeral parlor, where it was cremated. 
  
At least, that’s how Frank Sheeran tells the story. And a lot of knowledgeable people 
(Arthur Sloane, Joe Pistone, Bryan Burrough, William D’Elia, and others) find it credible.  
  
So, in such an anticlimactic way did the remarkable life of a remarkable person come to an 
end, a life lived at the very center of the most dramatic events of the age. 
  
Hoffa’s disappearance did have one positive result: it jolted the federal government into 
systematic action against organized crime, action not just in the context of a battle against a single 
individual and his unacceptably powerful union but as the beginning of a decades-long war of 
 attrition. In the following years, the FBI hunted down the men it knew were involved in the murder 
and imprisoned them all on one charge or another (except for those who were themselves killed). 
The Mafia continued to infest the Teamsters until the 1ate 1980s and even 1990s, but federal 
prosecution, assisted by Teamsters for a Democratic Union and a reformist president in the 1990s 
(Ron Carey), finally succeeded in almost completely ridding the IBT of its ancient ties to 
racketeers. Today, the Teamsters isn’t the awe-inspiring force it used to be, but it is still one of the 
largest unions in the United States, with 1.4 million members. 
  
As for its greatest leader, Jimmy Hoffa, he’ll always be something of an enigma. On the 
one hand, he was no saint, nor was he a hero. He sometimes acted in amoral, brutal ways. While 
his biographer Arthur Sloane is right that the more lurid accusations (that he ordered murders, for 
instance, or even the assassination of JFK) have never been proven, and also that he was more 
independent of the Mafia than is generally supposed, Hoffa was not the kind of man or labor leader 
who should be copied in every particular. What he was was a concentrated, brilliant reflection of 
his environment, differing from other ruthless power players of his age and ours chiefly in that the 
side he chose was that of the working class, not the business class. He helped create the postwar 
middle class, in the process becoming arguably the most popular and the most reviled labor leader 
in U.S. history.  
  
But perhaps his greatest legacy can be summed up in the inscription on a plaque he 
displayed on his desk: Illegitimi non carborundum. Don’t let the bastards grind you down. 
